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Abstract:  
Using a unique database of 190 newly privatized firms from 36 countries, we investigate 
the impact of shareholders’ identify on corporate risk-taking behavior. We find strong 
and robust evidence that state (foreign) ownership is negatively (positively) related to 
corporate risk-taking. Moreover, we find that these relations depend on the level of 
government extraction. Our results suggest that relinquishment of government control, 
openness to foreign investment, and improvement of country-level governance 
institutions are key factors in the success of privatization reform. 
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Corporate Risk-Taking in Privatized Firms: International Evidence on 
the Role of State and Foreign Owners 
 
1. Introduction 
While a large body of literature documents that agency conflicts resulting from the 
separation between ownership and control affects various firm decisions (e.g., firm 
restructuring, divestment, and mergers), an issue that remains largely unexplored is the impact 
of shareholders’ identity on corporate risk taking, a fundamental driver of long-term economic 
growth (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997; Baumol et al., 2007). Understanding how ownership 
identity affects risk-taking behavior is important as the recent wave of government bailouts to 
contain the international financial crisis resulted in an expanding role of the state in troubled 
firms. In this paper we provide the first evidence on the link between risk-taking behavior and 
the identity of owners in newly privatized firms (NPFs hereafter), focusing primarily on two 
types of owners: the government as a residual owner, and foreign shareholders. The 
privatization context is an opportune setting to investigate the link between ownership identity 
and corporate risk-taking because of the dramatic change in ownership structure that occurs 
around divestiture. Also, exploring corporate risk-taking in the privatization context is all the 
more relevant since privatizations are implemented primarily to foster firm’s growth and 
productivity, both driven by the managerial risk choices in corporate investment decisions 
(John et al., 2008). 
Privatization can be defined as the deliberate sale by a government of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs hereafter) or assets to private economic agents.  Such reforms are often 
implemented to restructure SOEs that tend to underperform privately owned firms. The shift in 
ownership and control to private owners accompanying privatization changes the 
organization’s prevailing incentive structure, with greater emphasis placed on profits and 
efficiency (Boycko et al., 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The shift in incentives resulting from 
privatization is thus likely to affect the risk-taking behavior and subsequent performance of 
NPFs. The effect of ownership on postprivatization corporate risk-taking is likely to depend on 
how control is allocated across types of owners during the privatization process. 
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The purpose of this paper is to answer the call of John et al. (2008) for research that 
examines the relation between stakeholder governance and corporate growth as driven by risk- 
taking. While prior research focuses on the institutional determinants of risk-taking (John et al., 
2008; Acharya et al., 2009 and Griffen et al., 2009) or on the link between risk-taking and 
shareholder diversification/concentration (Faccio et al., 2009 and Paligirova, 2010) for publicly 
traded firms, we take an alternative perspective and advance the literature on two fronts: we 
focus on the impact of shareholder identity on investment policy and we consider the special 
case of privatized firms. More specifically, in this study we narrow the gap in the literature by 
examining the risk-taking behavior of the government and foreign owners in NPFs. 
In this paper, we consider first the impact of residual state ownership in NPFs on 
corporate risk-taking.  We argue that strong government intervention may lead firms to pursue 
conservative investments (i.e., less risky projects). For instance, government policies that seek to 
maximize social stability and employment (Fogel et al., 2008) may constrain NPFs’ ability to 
undertake risky investments. These policies seeking to maximize employment and wages, aim 
at ensuring the government’s re-election and its political tenure in power, and are not 
necessarily in line with profit or value maximization. In addition, in NPFs, the government 
appoints managers (bureaucrats) that are good at dealing with politicians but not necessarily at 
effectively facing competitive market conditions. The lack of adequate monitoring of these 
politically-oriented managers/bureaucrats by an individual owner with the necessary 
incentives to engage in active monitoring (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988, 1991; Laffont and Tirole, 
1993) will likely discourage risky investments, thus hindering or delaying postprivatization 
performance improvements (Fan et al., 2007; Boubakri et al., 2008).  
Second, we analyze the impact of foreign participation in NPFs on corporate risk-taking. 
Foreign owners who are offered tranches in NPFs tend to be profit maximizers and hence are 
likely to undertake value-enhancing capital budgeting decisions (i.e., more risky projects). 
Frydman et al. (1999) argue indeed that, given their financial resources and managerial know-
how, foreign investors have an advantage over other types of owners. Gillan and Starks (2003) 
and Ferreira and Matos (2008) provide supporting evidence that foreign owners play a more 
active role than local investors in advocating better firm-level governance, leading to positive 
performance outcomes, reached by undertaking risky investments.  
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Finally, we investigate whether the quality of the government extraction affects the 
association between the level of ownership by the state and foreign owners and risk-taking.  In 
better governance environments, corporate risk-taking increases (John et al., 2008). In contrast, 
in countries with a high level of predation and expropriation, managers have greater incentives 
to divert resources and consume perks (Stulz, 2005 and Durnev and Fauver, 2009).  In NPFs, 
Guedhami et al. (2009) show that foreign and government owners’ incentives for transparency, 
which reduces information asymmetry and the impulse for expropriation, are conditioned by a 
country’s governance environment. Consequently, the degree of risk-taking by the government 
and foreign owners in NPFs is likely to depend on such environment.  
Using a unique database of 190 NPFs from 36 countries, we find strong and 
economically significant evidence that state ownership is negatively related to corporate risk-
taking while foreign ownership is positively related to risk-taking. These results suggest a 
divergence in the interests of different types of shareholders. Our results are robust to a battery 
of tests and sensitivity analysis including considering different proxies for the risk-taking and 
the government control and confronting the issue of endogeneity and simultaneity between the 
owners’ identity and the risk taking.  We also find that the relations between shareholder 
identity and corporate risk-taking depend on the level of government extraction. Specifically, 
risk-taking is more adversely affected by residual government ownership in high expropriation-
risk environments. This result is in line with prior evidence that government rent-seeking 
behavior is likely to act as a progressive tax on high earnings (John et al., 2008), or to lead to the 
outright expropriation of firm assets (Glaeser et al., 2004; Caprio et al., 2009), thus discouraging 
corporate risk-taking.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, by showing how 
postprivatization ownership structure conditions NPFs’ risk-taking, which affects in turn firm 
performance, we extend the corporate governance literature on the link between ownership 
structure and firm performance (Frydman et al., 1999; Gupta, 2005; Boubakri et al., 2005). 
Second, our study contributes to the corporate finance literature by providing evidence that risk 
choices are affected not only by large shareholder characteristics (Faccio et al., 2009) or country-
level investor protection (John et al., 2008) but also by ownership structure/identity.  Finally, 
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we add to the literature on law and finance and privatization by documenting that the extent of 
government extraction conditions the risk-taking behavior of state and foreign owners.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop our hypotheses. In 
Section 3, we describe the sample and variables used in this study and we present descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 reports empirical results on the relation between ownership identity and 
risk-taking, and Section 5 provides results on the role of the level of government extraction. 
Section 6 summarizes and concludes.   
2. Hypotheses 
Prior research implies that serious agency problems between state owners and private 
investors (foreign and local) accompany privatization (e.g., Coffee, 1999; Denis and McConnell, 
2003; and Boubakri et al., 2005). As we discuss in the introduction, in this paper we exploit this 
high-information asymmetry setting to estimate the association between shareholders’ 
ownership levels and corporate risk-taking. In particular, we analyze the relations between 
corporate risk-taking and two forms of ownership, the government as a residual owner and 
foreign investors. The first two subsections below develop our hypotheses for each of these 
forms of ownership in turn. In the third subsection we develop our hypothesis on the impact of 
the level of government extraction. 
2.1. Corporate risk-taking of the government 
 
We rely on the economic theory of privatization, namely, the political and managerial 
views of the inefficiency of SOEs, to develop our hypotheses on corporate risk-taking by the 
government in NPFs. 
The political view of SOEs posits that public enterprises are inefficient because the 
inefficiency serves politicians’ interests (Boycko et al., 1996). Indeed, the goals pursued by 
politically-oriented managers are not necessarily in line with profit or value maximization. 
Their objectives are rather to maximize employment and wages, promote regional 
development, and ensure national security. These objectives generally aim to ensure success in 
elections and a long tenure in power. In the context of a model in which a firm can deliver 
benefits to politicians, Shleifer and Vishny (1994: 1009) conclude that “When the government 
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maintains control over firms, privatizing cash flows simply enables politicians to extract more 
from managers, in the form of either bribes or excess employment. This also implies that if the 
government wants to continue tight regulation over firms, it would not get much revenue from 
privatization. For privatization of cash flows to lead to restructuring, surrender of control by 
politicians to the managers and private shareholders is the first step.” Evidence provided by 
Boubakri et al. (2008) supports the implications of this model. More specifically, using an 
international sample of privatized firms, the authors find that politically-connected privatized 
firms, which are associated with a high level of government ownership, underperform their 
non-connected counterparts.  
The managerial view of SOEs posits that these firms are inefficient because their 
managers are not adequately monitored, leading to poor incentive structures, as there is no 
individual owner with the necessary incentives to engage in active monitoring (Vickers and 
Yarrow, 1988, 1991; Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Privatized firms in which the government has a 
significant stake have the power to appoint managers (bureaucrats) that are good at dealing 
with politicians but not necessarily at effectively facing competitive market conditions. In this 
case, postprivatization performance improvements, reached by undertaking risky investments, 
may not be achieved (Fan et al., 2007; Boubakri et al., 2008). Indeed, Dyck (2001: 61) argues that 
“A major obstacle to securing investment is the prospect that those delegated with decision-
making power will not use that authority to deliver what was promised but will instead divert 
the returns for their own benefit.” Likewise, John et al. (2008) show that managerial diversion of 
corporate resources for private benefits prevents firms from undertaking risky projects. 
Both the managerial and the political views suggest that state owners pursue objectives 
that are potentially in conflict with those of shareholders, who tend to focus on profit 
maximization. For instance, the government is less likely to seek performance improvements 
through cost cutting or to undertake risky investments that may lead to opposition from 
employees/voters. Outside the context of privatization, but corroborating the above arguments, 
Fogel et al. (2008) contend that a powerful government may influence firms to be conservative 
in their investments to stabilize social benefits and employment. Based on this discussion, we 
hypothesize that the extent of government control over NPFs is negatively related to corporate 
risk-taking.  More formally:  
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H1: Government ownership of NPFs is negatively related to corporate risk-taking, all else being 
equal. 
2.2. Corporate risk-taking of foreign owners  
Doidge et al. (2009) and Leuz et al. (2009) find that, in contrast to government owners, 
foreign investors avoid investing in poorly governed firms. Poorly governed firms suffer from 
serious information problems that have an adverse effect on managerial risk-taking, whereas 
good corporate governance mitigates these problems. The results of Doidge et al. (2009) and 
Leuz et al. (2009) therefore suggest that foreign owners should be associated with more 
managerial risk-taking than government owners. In the same vein, Gillan and Starks (2003) and 
Ferreira and Matos (2008) document that foreign owners play a more active role than local 
investors in advocating better firm-level governance which may influence corporate investment 
policy. Also, Boycko et al. (1996), Dyck (2001), and D’Souza et al. (2005) show that privatized 
firms exhibit better governance and/or performance when foreign investors own larger stakes, 
and Denis and McConnell (2003) conclude that ownership by foreign (state) investors is usually 
associated with better (worse) performance and hence higher (lower) firm value, which John et 
al. (2008) suggest is likely a result of a more (less) risky investment policy. Likewise, Stulz (1999) 
argues that opening capital markets to foreign investors can improve corporate governance, 
which can lead in turn to increased managerial risk-taking.  
Evaluating the impact of privatization on firm performance, Frydman et al. (1999) argue 
that, given their financial resources and managerial know-how, foreign investors have an 
advantage over other types of owners. The authors also show that foreign-owned firms are less 
inclined to reduce employment than all other categories of firms, which they interpret as 
evidence that foreign owners have a longer-term value-enhancing perspective. Consistent with 
these findings, Lizal and Svejnar (2003) show that in transition economies, firms privatized to a 
domestic owner exhibit a large long-term decline in profits while privatization to a foreign 
entity leads to a large positive impact on profits. They also show that capital stock increases at a 
faster rate for foreign-owned firms and, irrespective of the performance measure used, foreign 
owners unambiguously improve long-term performance of NPFs. One possible explanation for 
this evidence is that foreign ownership leads to increased firm value as a result of following a 
more risky investment policy. 
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Based on this discussion, we hypothesize that foreign investors, which bring with them 
not only fresh capital but also stronger corporate governance, are positively associated with 
corporate risk-taking in NPFs. More formally: 
H2: Foreign ownership of NPFs is positively related to corporate risk-taking, all else being equal. 
2.3. The impact of the level of government extraction on risk-taking 
John et al. (2008) show that in better governance environments, stakeholders such as 
creditors, labor groups, and the government are less able to reduce corporate risk-taking to 
pursue their self interest, that is, corporate risk-taking increases with the quality of country-
level governance. Similarly, Stulz (2005) and Durnev and Fauver (2009) argue that managers 
have greater incentives to divert resources in countries with a high level of predation and 
expropriation. In assessing foreign and government owners’ incentives for transparency, which 
reduces information asymmetry and the impulse for the consumption of private interests, 
Guedhami et al. (2009) also find that a country’s governance environment matters. As a result, 
the degree of risk-taking by government and foreign owners is likely to depend on the level of a 
country’s institutions. 
Under weak governance institutions, government expropriation and political benefits 
are typically high. Given that political benefits arising from predation are secured by the 
government, incentives to undertake risky investments are low. Consistent with this argument, 
Durnev and Fauver (2009) find that firms generally have less incentive to practice good 
governance, which positively affects risk-taking (John et al., 2008), if the government is 
predatory. This is all the more likely in privatized firms in which residual government 
ownership is high. In contrast, foreign owners are more likely to take risk in less predatory 
governments. As Knack and Keefer (1995:210) argue, “It is likely that if private actors cannot 
count on the government to respect the contracts it has with them, they will also not be able to 
count on the government enforcing contracts between two private parties…. This restriction on 
economic activity severely limits the universe of possible Pareto-improving exchanges that 
would otherwise be undertaken.” As a result, we expect risk-taking incentives by foreign 
owners to be stronger in environments with lower government extraction and higher investor 
protection.  
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Based on the arguments presented above, we hypothesize that risky investments by 
foreign and state owners are conditioned by a country’s level of government extraction. More 
formally: 
H3: Low (high) corporate risk-taking by government (foreign) owners is stronger given a high 
(low) level of government extraction. 
3. Sample and Variables 
 In this section, we begin by describing our sample of privatized firms. We then present 
our measures of corporate risk-taking and ownership structure along with the standard control 
variables used in the literature to explain corporate risk-taking.  
3.1. Sample 
 To investigate the impact of state and foreign ownership on corporate risk-taking, we 
compile a sample of 190 firms privatized from 23 emerging markets and 13 industrialized 
countries over the 1980 to 2004 period.1 We start with the sample constructed by Guedhami et 
al. (2009), which is well suited to our research objectives as it tracks state and foreign ownership 
following the divestiture of SOEs. Next, we exclude financial firms from the sample.2 We then 
update the database to include ownership data for up to the sixth year after the first 
privatization and we add recent privatizations. We use different sources for the addition of 
privatizations, including the World Bank’s privatization database for developing countries and 
the Privatization Barometer for developed countries. To be included in the sample, we require 
that the firm’s volatility of earnings be available for at least four consecutive years over the six 
years after privatization.  
                                                 
1 This sample is comparable with recent multinational studies on privatized firms: Boubakri et al. (2005) 
with a sample of 209 firms from 39 countries, Guedhami and Pittman (2006) with a sample of 190 firms 
from 31 countries, Bortolotti and Faccio (2009) with a sample of 141 firms from 22 countries, and 
Guedhami et al. (2009) with a sample of 176 firms from 32 countries.  
2 Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) are excluded because they are heavily regulated and hence are highly 
sensitive to the burden of regulation in a country (Faccio et al., 2009). We refer readers to Laeven and 
Levine (2009) for a cross-country analysis of corporate risk-taking by banks. 
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 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 190 firms considered in this study. Table 1 
shows that the 190 privatized firms are fairly evenly spread across geographical regions as 
categorized by the World Bank. In particular, 32.64% of firms are from Africa and the Middle 
East, 21.58% are from East and South Asia and the Pacific, 18.94% are from Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and 26.84% are from Europe and Central Asia.  The sample thus comprises 
countries with different levels of development as well as different legal, political, and 
institutional environments. Table 1 also reveals that our sample shows variation across 
Campbell’s (1996) industries with 28.42% of firms in utilities, 16.84% in basic industries, and 
13.16% in consumer durables. Table 1 further shows that 10.52% of the privatizations occurred 
in the 1980s compared to 89.48% between 1990 and 2004. These figures largely reflect the trend 
toward privatization in recent years, especially in the emerging markets.3 4  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
3.2. Variables  
3.2.1. Risk-taking  
 Our measure of corporate risk-taking (RISK1) is the volatility of an NPF’s earnings over 
four-year overlapping periods for a maximum of six years after privatization (i.e., 0,+3; +1,+4; 
+2,+5; and +3,+6),5 where firm earnings are given by return on assets (ROA), which is equal to 
                                                 
3 We follow the standard practice in the privatization literature and exclude firms from ex-communist 
countries (Megginson et al., 2004; Boubakri et al., 2005, 2011; Guedhami et al., 2009). There are two 
reasons for this exclusion. First, the legal systems in these countries are based on Soviet law, and have 
gone through many changes in their respective transition periods (La Porta et al., 2000). Second, the post-
privatization ownership structure in these countries is mainly determined by insiders (managers and 
employees). Recent references on the experience of these transition economies include Djankov and 
Murrell (2002) and Svejnar (2002).  
4 When we examine the World Bank list of privatized firms, we find that 30.48% of the firms are from 
Africa and the Middle East, 17.08% from East and South Asia and the Pacific, 42.35% from Latin America, 
and 10.09% from Europe and Central Asia. In addition, 80% of the privatization transactions occurred in 
the 1990s. These figures are comparable to those discussed in the text in reference to our sample. 
5 In our main analysis we consider volatility over four years as in Paligorova (2010) rather than over five 
years as in Faccio et al. (2009) given frequent changes in ownership structure in NPFs (Boubakri et al., 
2005). In robustness tests we rerun our analysis using five-year overlapping periods. The results are 
qualitatively similar.  
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the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets.6 The Appendix presents 
more details on the estimation of RISK1. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for our variables. 
We see that the mean (median) four-year volatility of ROA, RISK1, is 0.033 (0.022). For 
robustness, we also estimate five other measures of corporate risk-taking. The results 
throughout the paper remain qualitatively similar when using the alternative risk-taking 
proxies.  
3.2.2. Ownership 
 To analyze the incentives of governments and foreign investors to take risk, we follow 
John et al. (2008) and determine their ownership stakes at the end of the first year of the period 
over which the corporate risk-taking proxy is measured.  We hand-collect ownership structure 
and financial information from several data sources including Worldscope, BankScope, Asian, 
Brazilian, and Mexican Company Handbooks, Kompass Egypt Financial Year Book, and firms’ 
annual reports and offering prospectuses. Boubakri and Cosset (1998), Megginson (2003), and 
Bortolotti and Siniscalco (2004) provide supplementary data. 
In Table 2, we find that state ownership in NPFs displays a steep decline after the 
privatization date. Specifically, the average government stake (STATEOWN) plummets to 41.1% 
after privatization. Interestingly, control privatizations, in which the government maintains its 
control by selling less than 50% of the firm’s shares (CONTROL), comprise 45% of the total 
sample. Foreign investors’ average stake (FOREIGNOWN) reaches 10.5% after privatization. 
Consistent with prior privatization research (e.g., Jones et al., 1999 and Boubakri et al., 2005), 
governments tend to preferentially allocate higher stakes to domestic investors over foreign 
investors. Jones et al. (1999) argue that favoring local investors through share allocation allows 
governments to elicit more political support for privatization, create a culture of share 
ownership (popular capitalism), and develop local stock markets. Table 2 also reports 
significant shifts in domestic institutional ownership (LINSTOWN) for our sample. In particular, 
the average equity stake held by domestic institutions increases to 21.2% after privatization.7 It 
                                                 
6 To mitigate concerns regarding outliers and data entry omissions, we winsorize ROA at the 1% level on 
both sides of the sample distribution. 
7 We follow prior research in presenting the three major types of investors participating in the 
privatization process (Jones et al., 1999; Boubakri et al., 2005; Guedhami et al., 2009). Total equity capital 
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is important to stress, however, that the lion’s share of NPFs’ ownership change occurs 
immediately after privatization.            
3.2.3. Control variables and summary statistics 
       In addition to the ownership variables above, we include standard controls that prior 
studies show to be associated with risk-taking (Claessens et al., 2001; John et al., 2008; Faccio et 
al., 2009).  
First, we control for firm growth using total sales denominated in US$ 
(SALESGROWTH), which captures the influence of firm-specific growth opportunities on 
corporate risk-taking, and country-level growth using growth in real GDP in 1995 constant US$ 
(GDPGROWTH), which captures the effect of the country’s overall growth on managerial 
investment decisions. We expect both measures of growth to be positively related to corporate 
risk-taking. Next, we control for the effect of firm size (SIZE), which we measure using the 
natural log of total sales in millions of US$. In general, small firms are more risk-seeking than 
large firms and thus we expect a negative relation between firm size and our measure of risk-
taking. Our fourth control variable is firm profitability (ROA), which as before is equal to the 
ratio of EBIT to total assets. Our fifth control variable is the ratio of total debt to assets 
(LEVERAGE), which captures a firm’s level of leverage. Finally, we include country, year, and 
industry (as categorized by Campbell, 1996) dummies to control for the different fixed effects of 
these factors. We winsorize the firm-level variables at the 1% level in each tail of the sample 
distribution to reduce the influence of outliers in our estimates. All the independent variables 
enter the regression at the first year-end of the sample period over which the corporate risk-
taking proxy is measured (as in John et al., 2008). Firm-level control variables are mainly drawn 
from firms’ annual reports, Worldscope, and the different countries’ company handbooks.  
Table 2 shows that our sample of privatized firms includes both small and large firms as 
well as high and low leverage firms. Companies in the sample appear to be relatively profitable, 
with a mean (median) ROA of 0.075 (0.066), and exhibit a high level of growth, with a mean 
(median) SALESGROWTH of 0.111 (0.061). 
                                                                                                                                                             
averages slightly under 100% in Table 2, reflecting the presence of other owners that data limitations 
prevent us from identifying. 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 Panel A presents correlation coefficients for our variables of interest. As 
expected, risk-taking is negatively and significantly related with the level of state ownership 
(0.121) and positively and significantly related with the level of foreign ownership (0.125). We 
also find that risk-taking is positively related to firm profitability and sales growth and 
negatively related to firm size, firm leverage and GDP growth. The correlation between state 
and foreign ownership is negative and equal to -0.462 (significant at the 1% level). 
4. Corporate Risk-Taking and Ownership of NPFs 
 In this section we present evidence on the corporate risk-taking of state and foreign 
shareholders in NPFs using two different frameworks. First, we perform univariate analysis 
that does not control for the potential determinants of corporate risk-taking. We then capitalize 
on the panel nature of our data after privatization and run a pooled multivariate regression that 
controls for firm-level and country-level variables shown in the literature to explain corporate 
risk-taking.  
4.1. Univariate analysis 
 In Table 3 Panel B we report results of univariate tests. Specifically, we compare the 
means and medians of the corporate risk-taking proxy (RISK1) for above- and below-median 
(i.e., high and low) subsamples of state and foreign ownership. We find that RISK1 is 
significantly higher (lower) for the subsample of firms with high foreign (state) stakes in their 
ownership structure. In particular, we find that the mean (median) of RISK1 is equal to 0.041 
(0.026) for firms with below-median state ownership and drops to 0.025 (0.017) for firms with 
above–median state ownership, whereas the mean (median) of RISK1 is equal to 0.028 (0.019) 
for firms with below-median foreign ownership and rises to 0.038 (0.025) for firms with above-
median foreign ownership.8  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
                                                 
8 We do not find evidence at the univariate level that risk-taking is significantly different between above- 
and below-median subsamples of local institutional owners. 
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 Although these univariate tests provide preliminary support for our hypotheses on the 
impact of ownership identity on corporate risk-taking in NPFs, they only document binary 
relations and do not account for other potential explanatory variables. In the following section 
we perform a multivariate regression that controls for other determinants of firms’ risk-taking 
decision.     
4.2. Multivariate analysis 
In this section, we report our results on the impact of ownership identity on risk-taking 
using a pooled multivariate regression framework. Given the shift in NPFs’ ownership 
structure, especially immediately after privatization, a panel framework is well suited to our 
research question and can help shed light on the impact of shareholder identity on risk-taking 
in NPFs.9 We estimate the regressions using OLS and calculate robust standard errors corrected 
for clustering by firms as in Petersen (2009).  
Specifically, we estimate the following model (subscripts are suppressed for notational 
convenience): 
RISK1 =  +1 OWNERSHIP+2 CONTROLS + 


1
1
Y
Y
YEAR +


1
1
K
K
IND   +


1
1
C
C
CNT  +,     (1) 
where RISK1 is the volatility of firms’ ROA over four-year overlapping periods, OWNERSHIP is 
the percentage of shares held by the government or foreigners, CONTROLS denotes the set of 
control variables (SIZE, LEVERAGE, SALESGROWTH, ROA, and GDPGROWTH), YEAR, IND, 
and CNT are dummies that control for year, industry, and country fixed effects, respectively, 
and  is an error term. Given evidence that foreign investors are major stakeholders in the 
privatization process, especially in developing countries (Kikeri and Nellis, 2002; Boubakri et 
al., 2009), we perform the regressions by introducing state and foreign ownership separately to 
reduce the multicollinearity raised by cases in which the stake sold by the government is 
                                                 
9 Although Table 2 reports averages of post-privatization ownership stakes, the evolution of state and 
foreign ownership over the six years after privatizationavailable from the authorsstems from 
staggered sales (or subsequent share issues). For example, the ownership share of the state drops from 
42.14% in the year of privatization to 35.24% the third year following the divestiture. In the same vein, on 
average, foreign investors’ capital stake increases from 8.05% in the year of privatization and to 12.53% 
after three years. Local institutions’ ownership is 20.29% in the year of privatization and slightly higher at 
22.27% the third year following privatization. These descriptive statistics highlight the importance of 
conducting panel estimation rather than cross-sectional estimation that does not capture the specificity of 
NPFs’ capital structure when compared to publically traded firms as in John et al. (2008). 
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absorbed by foreigners. Nevertheless, in untabulated analysis in which we include state and 
foreign ownership in the same regression, the results remain qualitatively similar. 
       Our focus is on the coefficient 1, which measures the sensitivity of corporate risk-taking 
to the level of ownership of different types of owners.   
4.2.1. The impact of state ownership on corporate risk-taking 
  Table 4 reports the results of regressing corporate risk-taking on state ownership 
(STATEOWN) along with the control variables. In our main regression, Model 1, we use RISK1 
as the dependent variable. The results show that STATEOWN is negatively associated with 
corporate risk-taking in NPFs. This association is statistically significant at the 1% level. In line 
with the univariate results, these results support hypothesis H1, which posits that governments 
adopt more conservative risk-taking behavior. Our results are also economically significant. 
Indeed, the coefficient estimate on STATEOWN suggests that increasing state ownership from 
the first to the third quartiles (from 13% to 65%) results in a 58% decrease in the risk-taking 
proxy (from 0.041 to 0.026), holding all other variables at their mean values.  
Turning to the control variables, we observe several significant relations that are 
consistent with John et al. (2008) and Faccio et al. (2009). In particular, we find that ROA and 
LEVERAGE load positive and are statistically significant at the 5% level. We also find that firm 
size (SIZE) is negatively related to RISK1 and is statistically significant at the 5% level. Finally, 
SALESGROWTH is positively associated with RISK1 and statistically significant at the 5% level.  
In the remaining models of Table 4, we use alternative measures of corporate risk-taking 
to mitigate concerns that our evidence is driven by the proxy for firm risk-taking. In Model 2 we 
use RISK2, which is the standard deviation of ROA over five overlapping years for a maximum 
of six years following privatization (i.e., 0,+4; +1,+5; and +2,+6). Our previous results remain 
unchanged. Indeed, STATEOWN loads negative and is statistically significant at the 1% level. In 
Models 3 and 4 we consider RISK3 and RISK4, which are the maximum minus the minimum 
ROA over four and five overlapping periods, respectively. Our results again remain unchanged, 
with STATEOWN loading negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in Models 3 and 
4.  
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In Model 5 of Table 4, we consider a country-adjusted measure of the earnings volatility. 
This country adjustment presents difficulties and is debatable. First, using our sample firms to 
calculate the average ROA for a given country-year to adjust our firms’ earnings is 
inappropriate given the limited number of available observations. Second, in our regressions we 
control for the economic conditions by including GDPGROWTH and the country-fixed effects. 
Third, John et al. (2008) find that the results using a country-adjusted measure or total risk are 
qualitatively similar. Fourth, several sample firms are monopolies and a country or industry 
adjustment might be inappropriate (see also Boubakri and Cosset, 1998). Finally, relying on 
Compustat Global database to calculate the average ROA for a given country-year to adjust our 
firms’ earnings reduces our sample. 10 Nevertheless, in Model 5 we present this specification 
using a country-adjusted measure of risk-taking (RISK5) for a subsample of firms. RISK5 is 
equal to the volatility over four overlapping years of the difference between a firm’s ROA and 
the average ROA across all non-financial firms covered by Compustat Global in the country in 
which the firm is registered. The results continue to support our evidence. Indeed, STATEOWN 
enters negative and statistically significant at the 1%level.     
In Model 6 of Table 4, we consider the volatility of the return on sales (ROS), measured 
by the ratio of EBIT to total sales, over four overlapping years (RISK6). D’Souza and Megginson 
(1999) and Fan et al. (2007) stress that using ROS mitigates concerns that ROA is sensitive to 
inflation and accounting conventions and management since it involves two flow measures 
(EBIT and sales). Also, ROS reduces the bias on performance measures based on assets since the 
privatizations are primary offerings that increases the asset base of the firm substantially after 
the divestiture. Introducing RISK6 as a dependent variable does not change our evidence. 
Indeed, STATE enters negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.11Taken together, the 
evidence presented in Table 4 suggests that our results are unaffected by the choice of proxy for 
risk-taking or by the length of period over which the risk-taking proxy is calculated. 
                                                 
10 The number of observations drops from 547 for RISK1 to 402 for RISK5. Indeed, our sample includes 
only observations after 1987 when Compustat Global coverage began. Also, Compustat Global starts 
covering many developing countries of our sample in the middle of the nineties or latter. For example, 
Bangladesh enters in the database in 2000, Egypt in 1996, Jordan in 1997, Morocco in 1996, and Nigeria in 
2001. 
11 Our results are also robust to using the volatility of ROS over five overlapping years as a dependent 
variable. Also, all the results in the paper remain qualitatively similar when using RISK6 as a dependent 
variable.  
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 5 presents additional tests to ensure the robustness of our findings. First, in 
Models 1 and 2 we perform alternative econometric approaches. Specifically, in Model 1 we 
cluster errors at the country level instead of the firm level to introduce country specificity into 
our regressions, and in Model 2 we run a panel regression with random effects to account for 
unobservable firm-specific effects given that the determinants of corporate risk-taking are likely 
to be firm-specific. We find that using these alternative econometric approaches does not 
change our evidence. Indeed, STATEOWN loads negative and is statistically significant at the 
1% level in both models.  
Second, in Models 3, 4, 5, and 6 we consider different proxies for state control. Given the 
staggered nature of government sales after privatization, introducing STATEOWN in the first 
year over which RISK1 is calculated as in John et al. (2008) may overestimate the impact of 
government ownership during this period. To adjust for this fact, in Model 3 we replace 
STATEOWN with the average state ownership for the period over which RISK1 is calculated 
(AVG_STATEOWN). The results remain qualitatively unchanged, with AVG_STATEOWN 
loading negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. In Model 4 we follow Boubakri et 
al. (2005) and Guedhami et al. (2009) and replace STATEOWN with the dummy variable 
CONTROL, which is equal to one if the government retains control over the NPF (i.e., maintains 
more than 50% of the firm’s shares). We expect risk-taking to be lower in firms in which the 
government maintains control than in those in which it relinquishes control. The results are 
consistent with this expectation: CONTROL is negatively related to RISK1 and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This finding is also economically material: moving CONTROL from 0 
to 1 (i.e., government maintains control) while holding all other variables at their mean value 
decreases risk-taking by 38%, from 0.039 to 0.024. In Model 5 we control for CONNECTED, a 
dummy variable from Boubakri et al. (2008) that is equal to one if the firm is politically 
connected, that is, ” … if at least one member of its board of directors (BOD) or its supervisory 
board is or was a politician, that is, a member of parliament, a minister or any other top 
appointed-bureaucrat” (Boubakri et al., 2008: 657). Table 2 reports that 28% of our sample is 
politically connected. Fan et al. (2007) and Boubakri et al. (2008) show that politically connected 
NPFs exhibit lower accounting performance compared to unconnected firms. Accordingly, we 
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expect that governments appointing politicians in key positions within an NPF anticipate a 
conservative investment approach that serves the government’s political goals, that is, we 
expect connected NPFs to be less likely to undertake aggressive investment activities. 
Consistent with this expectation, we find that CONNECTED loads negative and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This finding is also economically material: moving CONNECTED 
from 0 to 1 (i.e., government maintains control through political connections) while holding all 
other variables at their mean value decreases risk-taking by 39%, from 0.036 to 0.022. In Model 6 
we consider an alternative definition of political connectivity, also from Boubakri et al. (2008), 
that allows the influence of political connections to depend on the strength of the connection. In 
particular, we consider the percentage of politically-experienced directors on the board, 
PERCON. The higher the number of politicians on the board, the higher the government’s 
influence should be. In contrast, an isolated politician on the board is not likely to have such 
influence.  The results in Table 5 show that including this variable as a proxy for government 
control does not change our inference on the negative impact of government ownership on risk-
taking: PERCON loads negative and is statistically significant at the 10% level.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
In summary, the results in Tables 4 and 5 show that state ownership is negatively related 
to corporate risk-taking. These results hold when using alternative lengths and measures for 
corporate risk-taking, when considering alternative econometric methods, and when using 
alternative measures of government ownership and control. We next turn to our results for 
hypothesis H2 on the impact of foreign ownership on corporate risk-taking.  
4.2.2. The impact of foreign ownership on corporate risk-taking 
Table 6 reports results of regressing Equation 1 using FOREIGNOWN as the 
independent variable of interest. In Model 1, our basic model, we regress RISK1 on 
FOREIGNOWN and the other control variables highlighted in section 3.2.3. In line with our 
univariate results, we find that FOREIGNOWN loads positive and is statistically significant at 
the 5% level, suggesting that in contrast to the government, foreign owners take more risk. In 
addition, the results are economically significant. For example, the coefficient on 
FOREIGNOWN suggests that foreign owners increase their risk-taking by 23% (from 0.031 to 
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0.038) when increasing foreign ownership by one standard deviation from its mean value (from 
10% to 29%), holding the other variables at their mean values. As in Table 4, Models 2, 3, 4, 5 
and 6 of Table 6 report results using the alternative dependent variables RISK2, RISK3, RISK 4, 
RISK5 and RISK6, respectively. The results suggest that irrespective of the proxy for or the 
length of the measure of corporate risk-taking, our results remain unaffected with 
FOREIGNOWN loading positive and statistically significant at the 5% level or better in the 
different models.   
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
In Table 7, we run additional tests to ensure the robustness of our results. First, using 
alternative econometric procedures, namely, clustering of observations at the country level in 
Model 1 and estimation with random effects in Model 2, does not affect our evidence: 
FOREIGNOWN is positive and statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
Second, when we introduce different types of ownership identity, namely, STATEOWN, 
FOREIGNOWN, and LINSTOWN, in Model 3, the results continue to remain unchanged. In 
particular, STATEOWN (FOREIGNOWN) remains negatively (positively) and statistically 
significantly at the 5% level associated with RISK1. LINSTOWN loads positive but is 
insignificant.12 Third, following Faccio et al. (2009), we additionally introduce two institutional 
variables, namely, ACC an index driven from Kurtzman et al. (2004) that measures the financial 
reporting quality, which is one of the subindices of their opacity index, and the Djankov et al.’s 
(2008) ANTISELFDEALING score that capture the regulation of corporate self-dealing 
transactions along three dimensions: disclosure, approval procedures for transactions, and 
facilitation of private litigation when self-dealing is suspected.13 14 The results are reported in 
                                                 
12 In an unreported specification, we regress RISK1 on LINSTOWN and the other firm-level control 
variables and fixed effects. Introducing LINSTOWN alone as a control for ownership identity does not 
change the evidence reported in Model 3 of Table 7. Indeed, LINSTOWN continues to load positive 
(=0.007) but insignificant (t-stat=0.59).  
13  We rely on ACC index rather than other accounting quality measures since Kurtzman et al. (2004) 
database covers more countries contained in our sample, especially the developing countries. Also, when 
controlling for the earnings management, as measured by Leuz et al. (2003), at the firm-level, we lose a 
significant number of observations due to the scarcity of detailed financial data, especially in African 
countries and for firms privatized in the eighties (see also Boubakri and Cosset, 1998).  
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Model 4 and show that our evidence remains qualitatively similar. However, we do not find 
that ACC and ANTISELFDEALING enter significantly in this regression.  
In a natural extension of the analysis in Model 1 of Table 6, Models 5 and 6 of Table 7 
report results according to whether the government relinquishes control to evaluate whether 
foreign owners continue to play a significant role in the risk-taking of NPFs in which there is 
less government interference. Consistent with such a role, FOREIGNOWN loads positive and 
significant at the 10% level in Model 6 when the government no longer holds a majority equity 
stake. In sharp contrast, the coefficient on FOREIGNOWN is statistically indistinguishable from 
zero when the government retains control in Model 5, implying that foreign owners take more 
risk in firms in which they are less likely to face government interference.  
Next, in Models 7 and 8 of Table 7 we divide our sample into firms that are politically 
connected and those that are not in order to evaluate whether foreign owners’ risk-taking 
behavior takes political interference into account. Consistent with such considerations, we find 
that FOREIGNOWN loads positively significant (at the 5% level) only for the subsample of firms 
in which the government does not play a role through political appointments (Model 8). For the 
subsample of politically connected firms (Model 7), the coefficient on FOREIGNOWN is 
insignificant.  
Finally, in Models 9 and 10 of Table 7 we divide our sample according to whether the 
firm holds a golden share. A golden share endows the government with special veto power 
over major financing and operating decisions.15 The dummy variable GOLDEN SHARE, which 
is equal to one for firms holding a golden share, is drawn from Boubakri et al. (2009). In Model 
10 we find that foreign investors take more risk in firms without a golden share: in this 
                                                                                                                                                             
14 Djankov et al. (2008) stress that anti-self dealing index performs better than the other investor 
protection measures. 
15 Bortolotti and Faccio (2009: 2918) define a golden share in privatized firms as “the set of the state’s 
special powers and statutory constraints on privatized companies. Typically, special powers include (1) 
the right to appoint members in corporate boards; (2) the right to consent to or to veto the acquisition of 
relevant interests in the privatized companies; and (3) other rights such as to consent to the transfer of 
subsidiaries, dissolution of the company, ordinary management, etc. The above mentioned rights may be 
temporary or not. On the other hand, statutory constraints include (1) ownership limits, (2) voting caps, 
and (3) national control provisions.” 
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regression, FOREIGNOWN loads positive and is statistically significant at the 5% level. In 
contrast, we do not find such evidence in Model 9.16  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Overall, the results in Tables 6 and 7 show that foreign ownership is positively 
associated with corporate risk-taking. These results hold when using alternative lengths and 
measures for corporate risk-taking, and when considering alternative econometric methods. 
Foreign owners tend to take more risk, especially if the government relinquishes direct or 
indirect control (i.e., through majority residual ownership, by appointing politicians within the 
NPF, or by holding a golden share). 
4.2.3. Endogeneity and sample composition 
One potential concern with the base-case regressions in Tables 4 and 6 is that 
STATEOWN and FOREIGNOWN may not be exogenous. Specifically, some unobserved 
determinants of corporate risk-taking may also explain ownership structure, leading OLS 
estimates to be biased and inconsistent. In Table 8, Models 1-4, we confront the issue of 
endogeneity using two-stage instrumental variable estimations.17 We use a country’s 
institutional environment, measured by LAWORDER, as an instrument for state ownership. 
LAWORDER ranges from 0 to 6. It is derived from the ICRG, and captures the extent of law 
enforcement in addition to the laws on the books. This choice of instrument is motivated by 
prior literature that shows that a country’s institutional environment is exogenous (La Porta et 
al., 1998, 2006) and closely associated with both the pervasiveness of state ownership (e.g., La 
Porta et al., 1999; Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009) and the extent of privatization by governments 
(Bortolotti et al., 2004).18 We use the property rights index derived from Economic Freedom of the 
World by Gwartney et al. (2008), PROPERTY, as an instrument for foreign ownership. This 
                                                 
16 This result should be interpreted carefully given the small number of firms in our sample that maintain 
a golden share. Indeed, we find that only 17 firms in our sample hold a golden share compared to 88 
without such a control device. 
17 This approach to addressing endogeneity of state and foreign ownership is common in research on 
privatization (e.g., Guedhami et al., 2009; Ben-Nasr et al., 2009; Borisova and Megginson, 2010). 
18 Adding support to our choice of LAWORDER as an instrument, in John et al. (2008) this proxy loads 
insignificantly when explaining risk-taking in an international sample.   
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choice is motivated by evidence in Chhibber and Majumdar (1999) that foreign owners in India 
are more inclined to invest in Indian firms after the implementation of reforms that result in 
stronger protection of property rights. PROPERTY ranges from 0 to 100 and assesses the ability 
of individuals to accumulate private property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by 
the state. It also assesses the likelihood that private property will be expropriated and the 
independence of the judiciary, the extent of corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of 
individuals and businesses to enforce contracts.  
In first-stage regressions, we predict state and foreign ownership using the institutional 
environment index, LAWORDER, in Model 1 and the property rights protection index, 
PROPERTY, in Model 3, respectively, along with the other independent variables discussed 
earlier. Consistent with prior research (Boubakri et al., 2005 and Chhibber and Majumdar, 1999), 
the first-stage regressions show that LAWORDER and PROPERTY are good predictors of state 
and foreign ownership, respectively. Indeed, LAWORDER enters negatively and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level in Model 1, suggesting that governments retain higher stakes in 
countries with weak institutions, while PROPERTY loads positively and is statistically 
significant at the 5% level in Model 3, suggesting that foreign investors have more incentives to 
acquire stakes in countries that enforce property rights. Using the first-stage fitted values for 
STATEOWN and FOREIGNOWN in the second-stage regressions reported in Models 2 and 4, 
respectively, we continue to find that the coefficient on STATEOWN is negative, and that on 
FOREIGNOWN is positive, both statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, correcting for 
endogeneity, that is, using the instrumental variable (IV) approach, does not appear to affect 
our main evidence on the divergent impact of state and foreign owners on corporate risk-
taking. When we perform the exogeneity J-test of over-identifying restrictions, we find 
supportive evidence that these instruments are relevant and exogenous. When we additionally 
regress the residuals of the IV regressions on the instruments and control variables, we find that 
the independent variables are jointly insignificant, further suggesting that the instruments are 
exogenous. 
Another concern with our main analyses may be that government and foreign 
ownership are influenced by the economic characteristics of the firm, with corporate risk-taking 
being one of these characteristics. For example, the government could maintain a higher stake in 
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less risk-taking firms to extract higher private benefits (e.g., political benefits). Alternatively, the 
government may retain control over less risk-taking NPFs because no acquirer is interested in 
investing such firms; similarly, foreign owners may choose to invest exclusively in high risk-
taking firms. Given the potential for endogeneity between ownership identity and risk-taking, 
in Models 5 through 8 of Table 8 we estimate two systems of simultaneous equations that treat 
ownership identity (STATEOWN and FOREIGNOWN) and risk-taking as jointly determined. 
We perform the estimation using a two-stage procedure as described in Maddala (1983) that 
allows for correlation of errors across equations (see also Guedhami et al., 2009). In Models 5 
and 7, we find that LAWORDER (PROPERTY) is negatively (positively) and significantly related 
to state (foreign) ownership. More important for our purposes, we continue to find that 
STATEOWN and FOREIGNOWN are positively and negatively associated with RISK1 and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, respectively. 19     
A final concern with our main analyses may relate to our sample being dominated by 
firms privatized during the 1990s. Several countries, under pressure from the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund, launched a privatization program during the 1990s, especially 
in the emerging markets (Megginson and Netter, 2001). To mitigate concerns that our results are 
driven by privatizations that occurred outside this period, we rerun our analyses limiting 
attention to transactions over the 1990-2000 period. The results reported in Table 8 Models 9 and 
10 for the state ownership equation and foreign ownership, respectively, show that our main 
evidence is not affected. STATEOWN loads negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
and FOREIGNOWN loads positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
5. The Impact of Country-Level Government Extraction  
Recent evidence implies that firm-level corporate risk-taking hinges on country-level 
governance institutions (e.g., John et al., 2008). Theoretically, Stulz (2005) and Durnev and 
Fauver (2009) show that managers have greater incentives to divert resources in countries with 
                                                 
19 Also, since RISK1 is calculated over the upcoming four years in which the ownership variables enter, 
this mitigates concerns that governments (foreigners) choose to invest in low (high) risk-taking firms and 
hence reduces concerns about reverse causality.  
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a high level of predation and expropriation. Avoiding value-maximizing projects and risk-
taking could be a mechanism that managers use to divert or at least stabilize company 
resources. Empirically, Guedhami et al. (2009) find evidence that foreign and government 
owners’ incentives for transparency, which reduces information asymmetry and increases the 
impulse for risk-taking, differ according to the level of a country’s governance institutions. 
Caprio et al. (2009) further find that in countries where the threat of political extraction and 
corruption is higher, firms hold a lower fraction of their assets in liquid form. Firms with scarce 
liquid assets might have to forgo profitable investment opportunities that would increase firm 
value if sufficient funds could be generated. These studies therefore suggest that our findings of 
low (high) risk-taking by state (foreign) owners could differ according to the level of 
government extraction.  
We extend our analyses above to study the impact of the level of government extraction 
on risk-taking by governments and foreign owners. We rely on two different measures to 
capture country-level of government extraction, namely, the level of government corruption, 
CORRUPTION, and the level of government expropriation, EXPROPRIATION. Both variables 
come from the ICRG and are widely used in the literature as a measure of government 
extraction (e.g., Caprio et al., 2009; Durnev and Fauver, 2009; among others). EXPROPRIATION 
ranges from 0 to 12 and is defined by the ICRG as “an assessment of factors affecting the risk to 
investment that are not covered by other political, economic and financial risk components. The 
subcomponents are: Contract Viability/Expropriation; Profits repatriation; Payment Delays.” 
Each subcomponent ranges from 0 to 4. CORRUPTION ranges from 0 to 6 and is defined by the 
ICRG as “an assessment of corruption within the political system…. The most common form of 
corruption met directly by business is financial corruption in the form of demands for special 
payments and bribes.” The ICRG continues, stating that “Such corruption is a threat to foreign 
investment for several reasons; it distorts the economic and financial environment, it reduces 
the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power 
through patronage rather than ability, and, last but not least, it introduces an inherent instability 
into the political process…. Such corruption can make it difficult to conduct business effectively, 
and in some cases may force the withdrawal or withholding of an investment.” Both indices are 
designed such that higher scores reflect greater government expropriation or corruption. We 
expect that state owners will take less risk in countries with higher corruption or expropriation, 
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compared to countries with lower corruption or expropriation. Knack and Keefer (1995) show 
that a high level of corruption negatively affects the level of economic development, which is 
itself shaped by risk-taking (Baumol et al., 2007). In the same vein, Durnev and Fauver (2009) 
find that owners have less incentives to encourage value maximization by managers, and hence 
risk-taking, if the government is likely to expropriate firm profits. This finding is especially true 
in the NPFs in which the state maintains an important stake.  
To avoid complications stemming from the high correlations between the government 
extraction variables and their interaction terms, we bisect the sample at the median values for 
EXPROPRIATION and CORRUPTION. We then estimate Equation (1) focusing on state 
ownership in Models 1 to 4 of Table 9 and on foreign ownership in Models 5 to 8 of Table 9. We 
find that in countries where the level of government extraction is high (Models 1 and 3), 
STATEOWN loads negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This relation is not 
significant, however, in countries with low government extraction (Models 2 and 4). These 
results suggest that the risk-taking behavior of the government varies with the level of 
government extraction.  
The behavior of foreign owners is expected to be different from that of state owners. In 
particular, foreign owners are expected to take more risk in countries with lower levels of 
corruption and expropriation. Indeed, Knack and Keefer (1995) argue that if contracts are not 
respected by the government, investment by private investors, including foreigners, will be 
lower. Government quality is thus likely to condition the risk-taking by foreign owners. 
Consistent with this expectation we find that FOREIGNOWN loads negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level only in the subsample of countries with a low level of corruption or 
expropriation (Models 6 and 8). We do not find evidence that foreign owners undertake risky 
activities in the subsample of countries with a high level of expropriation or corruption (Models 
5 and 7).   
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
In summary, the results of this section suggest that although government (foreign) 
owners tend to take less (more) risk, all things being equal, this relation is stronger in countries 
with high (low) levels of government extraction.  
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6. Conclusion 
 In this paper we rely on a unique database of 190 privatized firms from 36 countries to 
investigate the impact of state and foreign ownership on corporate risk-taking, where we 
measure risk-taking using the volatility of earnings over four overlapping periods following the 
divestiture of SOEs. Corporate risk-taking behavior is important as it is fundamental to long-
term economic development (Baumol et al., 2007).  
Our first objective is to evaluate the impact of state ownership on risk-taking in NPFs. 
Heavy government intervention may lead firms to pursue conservative (i.e., less risky) 
investments. Our second objective is to assess the impact of foreign ownership on corporate 
risk-taking in NPFs. Foreign investors who have been offered tranches in NPFs are expected to 
bring financial resources and managerial know-how to former SOEs’, and thus are expected to 
positively affect risk-taking. 
In a pooled panel regression that controls for firm- and country-level variables 
associated with risk-taking, we provide evidence that state ownership is negatively related to 
corporate risk-taking while foreign ownership is positively related to risk-taking. These results, 
which are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests including endogeneity of the ownership 
structure and simultaneity of the relation, suggest a divergence in different types of 
shareholders’ interests with respect to investment. Moreover, we find that the relations between 
shareholder identify and corporate risk-taking depend on the level of government extraction.  
Our results have broad implications for policy makers. First, the benefits expected to 
result from privatization may not materialize under continued government control over NPFs. 
Moreover, reducing barriers to foreign direct investment and improving a country’s governance 
institutions, which condition the behavior of shareholders, can lead to a significant increase in 
corporate risk-taking, which is an important driver of a country’s economic growth and 
development. 
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 APPENDIX 
Variables, definitions, and sources  
Variable Definition Source 
Panel A. Corporate risk-taking variables 
 
 
RISK1 Company earnings volatility equal to 
Risk1 /T=4; Where  = 
 
Ni,t indexes the firm i and year t, and EBITi,t is defined as the 
earnings before interest and taxes of firm i in year t; Ai,t is 
equal to the total assets; T over (0 to+3, 
+1to+4,+2to+5;+3to+6).  
Mainly from firms’ annual 
reports and Worldscope 
RISK2 Company earnings volatility equal to 
Risk2 /T=5; Where  = 
 
Ni,t indexes the firm i and year t, and EBITi,t is defined as the 
earnings before interest and taxes of firm i in year t; Ai,t is 
equal to the total assets; T over (0 to+4, +1to+5,+2to+6).  
As above 
RISK3 Company risk-taking is equal to 
RISK3= Max(  -Min (  where  =  
Ni,t indexes the firm i and year t, and EBITi,t is defined as the 
earnings before interest and taxes in year t; Ai,t is equal to 
the total assets; T over (0 to+3, +1to+4,+2to+5,+3to +6) 
As above 
RISK4 Company risk-taking is equal to 
RISK4= Max(  -Min (  where  =  
Ni,t indexes the firm i and year t, and EBITi,t is defined as the 
earnings before interest and taxes in year t; Ai,t is equal to 
the total assets; T over (0 to+4, +1to+5,+2to+6). 
As above 
RISK5 Company risk-taking is equal to 
Risk5 /T=4; where  = 
, Nc,t indexes the firms within 
country c and year t, and EBITi,c,t is defined as the earnings 
before interest and taxes in year t; Ai,c,t is equal to the total 
assets; T over (0 to+3, +1to+4,+2to+5,+3to +6) 
Mainly from firms’ annual 
reports, Worldscope, and 
Compustat Global 
RISK6 Company earnings volatility equal to 
Risk6 /T=4; Where  = 
 
Ni,t indexes the firm i and year t, and EBITi,t is defined as the 
earnings before interest and taxes of firm i in year t; SALESi,t 
is equal to the total sales; T over (0 to+3, 
+1to+4,+2to+5;+3to+6).  
Mainly from firms’ annual 
reports and Worldscope 
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Panel B. Ownership and state control variables  
STATEOWN The percentage of shares held by the government. Mainly from firms’ annual 
reports and offering 
prospectuses 
AVG_STATEOWN Average state ownership for the period over which RISK1 is 
calculated. 
As above 
FOREIGNOWN The percentage of shares held by foreign investors. As above 
LINSTOWN The percentage of shares held by local institutions. As above 
CONTROL A dummy variable equal to one for firms in which the state 
maintains control following privatization. 
As above 
CONNECTED A dummy variable equal to unity for politically connected 
firms, and zero otherwise. 
Boubakri et al. (2008) 
PERCON The percentage of politically connected directors in the 
BOD. 
As above 
GOLDEN SHARE A dummy variable equal to unity for firms holding a 
golden share, and zero otherwise. 
Boubakri et al. (2009) 
Panel C. Firm-level control variables 
 
ROA The ratio of EBIT to total assets. Mainly from firms’ annual 
reports and offering 
prospectuses, and 
Worldscope 
LEVERAGE The ratio of total debt to total assets. As above 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total sales in US$. As above 
SALESGROWTH The firm sales growth using total sales denominated in US$. As above 
Panel D. Country-level control variables 
 
ACC 
An assessment of the quality of countries’ corporate 
accounting standards. 
Kurtzman et al. (2004) 
ANTISELFDEALING 
Average of ex-ante and ex-post private control of self-
dealing. 
Djankov et al. (2008) 
PROPERTY An assessment of the ability of individuals to accumulate 
private property, secured by clear laws that are fully 
enforced by the state. It also assesses the likelihood that 
private property will be expropriated and analyzes the 
independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption 
within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and 
business to enforce contracts. This variable ranges from 0 to 
100. Higher scores indicate higher property rights 
protection. 
Gwartney et al. (2008) 
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LAWORDER Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country. 
This variable ranges from 0 to 6. Higher scores indicate 
higher rule of law in the country. 
ICRG (2008) 
EXPROPRIATION Assessment of factors affecting the risk to investment that 
are not covered by other political, economic and financial 
risk components. The subcomponents are: Contract 
Viability/Expropriation; Profits repatriation; Payment 
Delays. This variable ranges from 0 to 12 with higher scores 
for higher risks. 
As above 
CORRUPTION Assessment of the corruption in government. High scores 
indicate “high government officials are likely to demand 
special payments” and “illegal payments are generally 
expected throughout lower levels of government” in the 
form of “bribes connected with import and export licenses, 
exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or 
loans”. This variable ranges from 0 to 6. Higher scores 
indicate higher corruption in the country. 
As above 
GDPGROWTH The annual change in the estimated GDP, at constant 1995 
prices, of a given country is expressed as a percentage 
increase or decrease. 
World Development 
Indicators. World Bank 
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TABLE 1 
Description of the sample of newly privatized firms 
Distribution of privatizations 
Panel A. By year  Panel B. By industry 
Year  Number  Percentage  Industry  Number  Percentage 
1980  1  0.53  Basic industries  32  16.84 
1981  1  0.53  Capital goods  6  3.16 
1985  4  2.11  Construction  10  5.26 
1986  3  1.58  Consumer durables  25  13.16 
1987  4  2.11  Food/tobacco  20  10.53 
1988  3  1.58  Leisure  2  1.05 
1989  4  2.11  Petroleum  17  8.95 
1990  12  6.32  Services  2  1.05 
1991  9  4.74  Textiles/trade  10  5.26 
1992  10  5.26  Transportation  12  6.32 
1993  9  4.74  Utilities  54  28.42 
1994  15  7.89       
1995  20  10.53  Total  190  100.00 
1996  19  10.00       
1997  23  12.11  Panel C. By region* 
1998  15  7.89  Region (countries)  Number  Percentage 
1999  9  4.74  Africa and the Middle East (11)  62  32.64 
2000  11  5.79  East and South Asia and the Pacific (12)  41  21.58 
2001  4  2.11  Latin America and the Caribbean (5)  36  18.94 
2002  5  2.63  Europe and Central Asia (8)  51  26.84 
2003  5  2.63  Total (36)  190  100.00 
2004  4  2.11       
Total  190  100.00       
Notes: This table reports the distribution of the sample of 190 privatized firms by year, industry, and region,  
*World Bank country group classification. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive statistics for the key regression variables 
 Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation Min Max 
 
RISK1 0.033 0.022 0.033 0.000 0.163 
RISK2 0.036 0.025 0.033 0.001 0.151 
RISK3 0.072 0.049 0.071 0.000 0.403 
RISK4 0.082 0.058 0.077 0.000 0.403 
RISK5 0.040 0.031 0.031 0.003 0.157 
RISK6 0.077 0.036 0.113 0.001 0.627 
STATEOWN 0.411 0.443 0.282 0.000 0.972 
FOREIGNOWN 0.105 0.031 0.190 0.000 1.000 
LINSTOWN 0.212 0.147 0.228 0.000 1.000 
CONTROL 0.450 0.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 
CONNECTED 0.277 0.000 0.448 0.000 1.000 
ROA 0.075 0.066 0.074 -0.206 0.288 
LEVERAGE 0.298 0.245 0.248 0.000 1.176 
SIZE 11.883 11.764 2.742 3.183 18.139 
SALESGROWTH 0.111 0.061 0.426 -0.738 3.033 
LAWORDER 4.115 4.000 1.140 1.000 6.000 
PROPERTY 57.289 50.000 14.483 30.000 90.000 
GDPGROWTH 4.429 4.642 2.631 -13.127 12.822 
EXPROPRIATION 7.924 7.833 1.868 2.417 12.000 
CORRUPTION 2.952 2.417 1.185 1.250 6.000 
      
Notes: This table reports summary descriptive statistics for the key regression variables 
used in the hypotheses tests to examine the impact of state and foreign ownership on 
corporate risk-taking for a maximum sample of 190 privatized firms from 36 countries.   
The definitions and data sources for the regression variables are outlined in the 
Appendix. 
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TABLE 3 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients and Univariate analysis 
 
 
Panel A: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 RISK1 FOREIGNOWN STATEOWN ROA LEVERAGE SIZE SALESG 
 
FOREIGNOWN 0.1249* 
      STATEOWN -0.1206* -0.4617* 
     ROA 0.0043 0.0144 -0.0290 
    LEVERAGE -0.0427 0.0223 -0.0547 -0.2126* 
   SIZE -0.1148* -0.0098 0.0513 -0.0693* 0.2399* 
  SALESGRWOTH 0.1308* 0.0057 0.0116 0.1084* -0.0274 0.0408 
 GDPGROWTH -0.0786* -0.0580 0.0874* 0.1214* -0.0823* -0.1452* 0.0300 
 
       Notes: Panel A reports Pearson correlations for the regression variables.  Boldface indicates statistical significance at 
the 1% level.  The definitions and data sources for the variables are outlined in the Appendix. 
 
Panel B: Univariate tests of risk-taking by shareholder identity and level 
  RISK1   
 Means  
T-Statistics 
Medians  
Z-Statistics Low 
Ownership 
(A) 
High 
Ownership 
 (B) 
Low 
Ownership 
 (C) 
High 
Ownership 
 (D) 
 
STATEOWN 0.041 0.025 5.812*** 0.026 0.017 5.510*** 
FOREIGNOWN 0.028 0.038 -3.447*** 0.019 0.025 -3.869*** 
       
Notes: Panel B reports measures of central tendency for risk-taking proxy (RISK1) for the high and low 
subsample of state and foreign ownership. The full sample includes 190 privatized firms from 36 countries.  
The superscripts asterisks ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  The definitions and data sources for the variables are outlined in the Appendix. 
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TABLE 4 
Regressions of risk-taking on state ownership and control variables 
 Basic Model Alternative Dependent Variables 
Variable (Prediction) RISK1 RISK2 RISK3 RISK4 RISK5 RISK6 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Intercept (?) 0.073*** 0.029 0.159*** 0.074 0.092*** 0.149** 
 (2.799) (1.339) (2.721) (1.516) (3.937) (2.057) 
STATEOWN (-) -0.028*** -0.037*** -0.061*** -0.091*** -0.028*** -0.102*** 
 (-2.780) (-2.934) (-2.843) (-3.120) (-3.008) (-4.227) 
LEVERAGE (+) 0.015** 0.026** 0.028* 0.054** 0.013 0.111** 
 (1.646) (1.959) (1.478) (1.869) (1.437) (1.992) 
ROA (+) 0.070** 0.106*** 0.162** 0.261*** 0.032 -0.273*** 
 (1.982) (2.898) (2.075) (2.997) (0.860) (-2.752) 
SIZE (-) -0.003** -0.002* -0.006** -0.005* -0.002* -0.007** 
 (-2.212) (-1.557) (-2.113) (-1.510) (-1.826) (-2.261) 
SALESGROWTH (+) 0.008** 0.003 0.017** 0.007 0.005 -0.021** 
 (2.039) (0.522) (2.013) (0.508) (1.195) (-2.363) 
GDPGROWTH (+) 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.062) (0.518) (-0.057) (0.504) (-0.707) (1.147) 
       
YEAR EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-Squared 0.286 0.353 0.290 0.365 0.273 0.325 
Observations 547 358 547 358 402 547 
Notes: this table reports OLS estimation of the following risk-taking model: 
RISK =  +1STATEOWN+2 CONTROLS +


1
1
Y
Y
YEAR +


1
1
K
K
IND   +


1
1
C
C
CNT  + 
where RISK  is a measure of corporate risk-taking; STATEOWN is the percentage of shares held 
by the government; and CONTROLS is a set of control variables (ROA, LEVERAGE, SIZE, 
SALESGROWTH and GDPGROWTH).  Model 1 considers RISK1 as the dependent variable. 
Models 2, 3, 4, and 5 consider RISK2, RISK3, RISK4, RISK5 and RISK6 as a dependent variable, 
respectively. The definitions and data sources for the variables are outlined in the Appendix.  
The full sample includes 190 privatized firms from 36 countries.  Beneath each estimate is 
reported the robust t-statistic clustered at the firm level.  The superscripts asterisks ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, one-tailed when 
directional predictions are made, and two-tailed otherwise. 
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TABLE 5  
Regressions of risk-taking on state ownership and control variables: Robustness tests 
 Alternative Econometrics Alternative State Control Variables 
Variable (Prediction) 
Cluster 
Country 
(1) 
Random 
Effects 
(2) 
AVG_STATE 
(3) 
CONTROL 
(4) 
CONNECTED 
(5) 
 
PERCON 
(6) 
       
Intercept (?) 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.096*** 0.070*** 0.098*** 0.064* 
 (4.096) (3.900) (3.155) (2.616) (2.764) (1.761) 
STATEOWN (-) -0.028*** -0.028***     
 (-2.831) (-2.331)     
AVG_STATEOWN (-)   -0.028***    
   (-2.562)    
CONTROL (-)    -0.016***   
    (-3.408)   
CONNECTED (-)     -0.014***  
     (-3.000)  
PERCON (-)      -0.029* 
      (-1.401) 
LEVERAGE (+) 0.015*** 0.013* 0.019* 0.016** 0.027*** 0.023** 
 (2.356) (1.506) (1.488) (1.744) (2.332) (1.834) 
ROA (+) 0.070** 0.110*** 0.085*** 0.071** 0.053* 0.053 
 (2.198) (2.643) (2.338) (2.030) (1.280) (1.203) 
SIZE (-) -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.002** -0.003** 
 (-3.121) (-2.422) (-2.355) (-2.209) (-2.066) (-2.222) 
SALESGROWTH (+) 0.008** 0.008*** 0.006* 0.008** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (2.098) (2.931) (1.298) (2.273) (3.027) (3.152) 
GDPGROWTH (+) 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.071) (-0.347) (-1.401) (-0.056) (-0.196) (-0.306) 
       
YEAR EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-Squared 0.286 0.265 0.351 0.291 0.361 0.345 
Observations 547 547 398 547 415 415 
Notes: this table reports OLS estimation of the following risk-taking model: 
RISK1=+1STATEOWN+2CONTROLS+


1
1
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Y
YEAR +

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1
1
K
K
IND+


1
1
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C
CNT  + 
where RISK1 is a measure of corporate risk-taking; STATEOWN is the percentage of shares held by the government; 
and CONTROLS is a set of control variables (ROA, LEVERAGE, SIZE, SALESGROWTH and GDPGROWTH). Model 1 
clusters the observations at the country level. Model 2 consider random effect panel estimation. Models 3, 4, 5 and 6 
control for AVR_STATEOWN, CONTROL, CONNECTED and PERCON, respectively, instead of STATEOWN.  The 
definitions and data sources for the variables are outlined in the Appendix. The full sample includes 190 privatized 
firms from 36 countries.  Beneath each estimate is reported the robust t-statistic clustered at the firm level.  The 
superscripts asterisks ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, one-
tailed when directional predictions are made, and two-tailed otherwise. 
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TABLE 6 
Regressions of risk-taking on foreign ownership and control variables 
 Basic Model Alternative Dependent Variables 
Variable (Prediction) RISK1 RISK2 RISK3 RISK4 RISK5 RISK6 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Intercept (?) 0.078*** -0.005 0.183*** -0.005 0.035 0.213*** 
 (3.107) (-0.182) (3.324) (-0.071) (1.277) (2.790) 
FOREIGNOWN (+) 0.034** 0.035** 0.077** 0.083** 0.032** 0.135*** 
 (2.140) (1.908) (2.159) (1.871) (2.243) (3.081) 
LEVERAGE (+) 0.014* 0.019* 0.025 0.036 0.014 0.126** 
 (1.344) (1.373) (1.151) (1.217) (1.306) (1.909) 
ROA (+) 0.058* 0.087*** 0.135** 0.220*** 0.015 -0.275*** 
 (1.652) (2.375) (1.731) (2.437) (0.384) (-2.845) 
SIZE (-) -0.004*** -0.004** -0.009*** -0.010** -0.004** -0.014*** 
 (-2.491) (-1.860) (-2.486) (-1.945) (-2.247) (-3.595) 
SALESGROWTH (+) 0.006* -0.000 0.014* 0.000 0.003 -0.018* 
 (1.545) (-0.059) (1.561) (0.012) (0.652) (-1.941) 
GDPGROWTH (+) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.709) (1.202) (0.594) (1.151) (-0.204) (1.060) 
       
YEAR EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-Squared 0.282 0.355 0.286 0.353 0.304 0.349 
Observations 436 300 436 300 299 436 
Notes: this table reports OLS estimation of the following risk-taking model: 
RISK=+1FOREIGNOWN+2CONTROLS+


1
1
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
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where RISK  is a measure of corporate risk-taking; FOREIGNOWN is the percentage of shares held by foreigners; 
and CONTROLS is a set of control variables (ROA, LEVERAGE, SIZE, SALESGROWTH and GDPGROWTH). 
Model 1 considers RISK1 as the dependent variable. Models 2, 3, 4, and 5 consider RISK2, RISK3, RISK4, RISK5 
and RISK6 as a dependent variable, respectively. The definitions and data sources for the variables are outlined 
in the Appendix.  The full sample includes 190 privatized firms from 36 countries.  Beneath each estimate is 
reported the robust t-statistic clustered at the firm level.  The superscripts asterisks ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, one-tailed when directional predictions are made, and 
two-tailed otherwise. 
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TABLE 7  
Regressions of risk-taking on foreign ownership and control variables: Robustness tests 
 
Alternative 
Econometrics 
Additional Controls CONTROL CONNECTED GOLDEN SHARE 
Variable (Prediction) 
Cluster 
Country 
Random 
Effects 
Ownership 
variables 
Institutional 
variables YES NO YES 
 
NO YES 
 
NO 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Intercept (?) 0.078*** 0.051*** 0.025** 0.033 0.016 0.135*** 0.055 0.093*** -0.091 -0.001 
 (4.007) (2.625) (2.078) (1.541) (1.105) (3.779) (1.120) (3.085) (-0.459) (-0.029) 
FOREIGNOWN (+) 0.034*** 0.038** 0.032** 0.036** 0.008 0.025* -0.046 0.037** 0.018 0.038** 
 (7.192) (1.808) (1.781) (1.940) (0.395) (1.280) (-0.758) (2.318) (0.155) (1.801) 
STATEWON (-)   -0.024** -0.022**       
   (-1.924) (-1.709)       
LINSTOWN (?)   0.003 0.008       
   (0.263) (0.568)       
LEVERAGE (+) 0.014* 0.016** 0.005 0.003 0.013* 0.032** 0.043 0.026** -0.095 0.028** 
 (2.010) (1.654) (0.574) (0.313) (1.578) (1.899) (0.864) (1.785) (-0.781) (1.800) 
ROA (+) 0.058** 0.104** 0.008 -0.011 0.182*** 0.053 0.042 0.071** 0.230 0.107** 
 (1.935) (2.216) (0.188) (-0.248) (5.295) (0.934) (0.612) (1.879) (0.682) (2.171) 
SIZE (-) -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.001* -0.002* -0.000 -0.004** -0.004 -0.002** 0.005 -0.003* 
 (-4.155) (-2.519) (-1.276) (-1.462) (-0.129) (-1.666) (-1.075) (-2.088) (0.560) (-1.358) 
SALESGROWTH (+) 0.006** 0.007*** 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.018** 0.002 0.019 0.002 
 (1.698) (2.154) (0.459) (0.605) (0.717) (0.592) (2.042) (0.569) (1.078) (0.397) 
GDPGROWTH (+) 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.965) (-0.143) (0.354) (-0.106) (-0.674) (0.195) (-1.652) (0.301) (-0.539) (1.196) 
ACC    -0.000       
    (-0.263)       
ANTISELFDEALING    0.004       
    (0.197)       
           
YEAR EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
           
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-Squared 0.282 0.251 0.289 0.202 0.675 0.310 0.617 0.410 0.972 0.309 
Observations 436 436 406 397 193 243 77 256 25 298 
Notes: this table reports OLS estimation of the following risk-taking model: 
RISK1=+1FOREIGNOWN+2CONTROLS+
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where RISK1  is a measure of corporate risk-taking; FOREIGNOWN is the percentage of shares held by foreigners; and CONTROLS is a set 
of control variables (ROA, LEVERAGE, SIZE, SALESGROWTH and GDPGROWTH). Model 1 clusters the observations at the country level. 
Model 2 considers a random-effects panel estimation. Model 3 includes STATEOWN and LINSTOWN as additional control variables. Model 
4 includes ACC and ANTISELFDEALING as additional control variables to Model 3. Models 5 and 6 split the sample according to whether 
the government keeps or relinquishes control, respectively. Models 7 and 8 split the observations according to whether the firm is 
connected or not, respectively. Models 9 and 10 split the observations according to whether the firms hold a golden share or not, 
respectively. The definitions and data sources for the variables are outlined in the Appendix. The full sample includes 190 privatized firms 
from 36 countries.  Beneath each estimate is reported the robust t-statistic clustered at the firm level.  The superscripts asterisks ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, one-tailed when directional predictions are made, and two-tailed 
otherwise. 
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TABLE 8 
Additional tests: instrumental variables, simultaneous equations, and alternative sample composition 
 
Instrumental 
Variable 
Instrumental 
Variable 
Simultaneous 
Equations 
Simultaneous 
Equations Sample Composition  
Variable (Sign) 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage STATE RISK1 FOREIGN RISK1 1990-2000 period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
Intercept (?) -0.589** 0.034 0.245 0.068 -0.309 0.083*** -0.244 0.029 0.021 0.089*** 
 (-2.253) (1.543) (0.638) (1.652) (-1.327) (4.130) (-1.125) (1.243) (0.843) (2.876) 
STATEOWN (-)  -0.040***    -0.040***   -0.029***  
  (-3.697)    (-3.657)   (-2.758)  
FOREIGNOWN (+)    0.098***    0.098***  0.034** 
    (2.412)    (2.521)  (2.083) 
LEVERAGE (+) -0.094 0.007 0.207* 0.003 -0.057 0.007 0.179 0.003 0.017** 0.015* 
 (-1.152) (0.759) (1.820) (0.204) (-0.736) (0.854) (1.655) (0.211) (1.703) (1.350) 
ROA (+) -0.297 0.054* 0.660* 0.040 -0.207 0.054* 0.481 0.040 0.073** 0.060* 
 (-1.315) (1.505) (1.951) (0.761) (-0.984) (1.569) (1.508) (0.810) (1.954) (1.530) 
SIZE (-) 0.036*** -0.001 -0.008 -0.002** 0.029*** -0.001* -0.001 -0.002** -0.003** -0.004*** 
 (3.564) (-1.231) (-1.041) (-1.702) (2.763) (-1.302) (-0.124) (-1.784) (-2.155) (-2.438) 
SALESGROWTH (+) -0.078*** 0.006* 0.057* 0.002  0.006*  0.002 0.009** 0.006* 
 (-3.593) (1.417) (1.776) (0.466)  (1.389)  (0.481) (1.959) (1.342) 
GDPGROWTH(+) -0.004 -0.001 0.005 0.001  -0.001  0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 (-0.872) (-1.249) (0.665) (0.855)  (-1.220)  (0.807) (-0.033) (0.453) 
LAWORDER (-) -0.094***    -0.092***      
 (-3.560)    (-3.378)      
PROPERTY(+)   0.005**    0.004**    
   (2.004)    (2.128)    
RISK1     -1.660***  1.331**    
     (-3.937)  (1.688)    
           
YEAR EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
           
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-Squared 0.442 0.128 0.247 0.220 0.466 0.155 0.261 0.125 0.291 0.276 
Observations 547 547 356 356 547 547 356 356 512 415 
Notes:  This table reports results from additional robustness tests that address the endogeneity of ownership structure and 
account for the simultaneous relation between risk taking and ownership levels. First-stage regressions results predicting state 
ownership (STATEOWN) and foreign ownership (FOREIGNOWN) are reported in Models 1 and 3, respectively.  In Models 2, 
and 4, we report the second-stage regressions of corporate risk-taking on fitted-values of STATEOWN and FOREIGNOWN, 
respectively.  We use in the first-stage regressions related to Model 2 a country’s law and order derived from the ICRG 
database to predict state ownership and in the first-stage regressions related to Model 4 the government’s property rights 
protection score derived from the Economic Freedom of the World database to predict foreign ownership. This table reports in 
Models 5-8 the risk taking model results from estimating two systems of simultaneous equations that treat state ownership and 
risk taking (Models 5 and 6) and foreign ownership and risk taking (Models 7 and 8) as jointly determined. This table also 
reports in Models 9 and 10 the results for the subsample of firms privatized during the period 1990-2000. The definitions and 
data sources for the variables are outlined in the Appendix.  The full sample includes 190 privatized firms from 36 countries. 
Beneath each estimate is reported the robust t-statistic clustered at the firm level.  The superscripts asterisks ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, one-tailed when directional predictions are made, and two-
tailed otherwise.   
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TABLE 9 
The impact of government extraction on risk-taking by state and foreign owners   
 
 
EXPROPRIATION 
 
CORRUPTION 
 
EXPROPRIATION 
 
CORRUPTION 
 HIGHT LOW HIGHT LOW HIGHT LOW HIGHT LOW 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Intercept (?) 0.100*** 0.149*** 0.042 0.055 0.179*** 0.068* 0.144*** 0.033 
 (2.798) (4.286) (0.932) (1.008) (4.399) (1.703) (3.849) (0.800) 
STATEOWN (-) -0.044*** -0.004 -0.040*** -0.008     
 (-2.713) (-0.308) (-2.365) (-0.600)     
FOREIGNOWN (+)     0.019 0.046** 0.020 0.045** 
     (1.005) (2.029) (0.990) (2.026) 
LEVERAGE (+) 0.019* 0.011 0.020* 0.022* 0.021* 0.025* 0.026** 0.019 
 (1.394) (0.827) (1.281) (1.565) (1.620) (1.458) (1.907) (1.077) 
ROA (+) 0.093** 0.064 0.104** 0.050 0.058 0.079* 0.062 0.072 
 (1.947) (0.974) (1.832) (0.750) (0.938) (1.487) (0.915) (1.232) 
SIZE (-) -0.002 -0.006*** -0.001 -0.004** -0.007*** -0.003* -0.006*** -0.003* 
 (-1.181) (-2.613) (-0.882) (-2.120) (-3.559) (-1.480) (-3.224) (-1.283) 
SALESGROWTH (+) 0.005 0.012*** 0.003 0.014*** 0.010** 0.001 0.010*** 0.002 
 (0.834) (2.378) (0.419) (3.149) (2.196) (0.095) (2.358) (0.350) 
GDPGROWTH (+) 0.001 0.000 0.001* -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.759) (0.127) (1.454) (-1.138) (-0.050) (0.994) (-0.362) (0.837) 
         
YEAR EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
COUNTRY EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-Squared 0.379 0.325 0.293 0.359 0.383 0.303 0.404 0.284 
Observations 312 235 273 274 183 253 208 228 
Notes: This table reports pooled OLS estimation results of the following corporate risk-taking model:  
RISK1=+1OWNERSHIP+2CONTROLS+
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where RISK1  is a measure of corporate risk-taking; OWNERSHIP is the percentage of shares held by foreigners or 
governments; and CONTROLS is a set of control variables (ROA, LEVERAGE, SIZE, SALESGROWTH, and 
GDPGROWTH). For the state ownership case, Columns 1 and 2 report the results for the subsample of firms from 
high and low EXPROPRIATION scores, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 report regression for the subsample of firms 
from high and low level of corruption, respectively. For the foreign ownership case, Columns 5 and 6 report the 
results for the subsample of firms from high and low EXPROPRIATION scores, respectively. Columns 7 and 8 
report regression for the subsample of firms from high and low level of corruption, respectively. The definitions 
and data sources for the variables are outlined in the Appendix.  The full sample includes 190 privatized firms 
from 36 countries. Beneath each estimate is reported the robust t-statistic clustered at the firm level. The 
superscripts asterisks ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, one-
tailed when directional predictions are made, and two-tailed otherwise. 
 
  
